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JOURNAL OF LEGAL EDUCATION
NORMALIZED LEGAL DRAFTING AND THE
QUERY METHOD
LAYmAN E. ALLEN * and C. RUDY ENGHOLM **
Normalized legal drafting is a mode of expressing ideas in statutes, regu-
lations, contracts, and other legal documents in such a way that the syntax
that relates the constituent propositions is simplified and standardized. This
"normalization" results in documents that are easier to understand in the
dual sense that they can be read faster and more accurately than correspond-
ing documents that are not normalized. The query method is a technique for
familiarizing learners with normalized drafting and providing practice in
some of the easier aspects of doing it.
NORMALIZED LEGAL DRAFTING
Introduction
It is hard to exaggerate the importance of language in law. The legal
profession holds itself out to the public as expert in the art of communication
through language, and yet, it is well known that there has been an old and
continuing problem of using language effectively to communicate the man-
dates of the legal system. There is little quarrel with the twin propositions:
(1) legal drafting is important, and (2) it is badly done now and needs to
be improved. (See Appendix A.) The virtue of language normalization and
its accompanying servant, the query method, is that they provide the seeds
for evolving both legal education and legal systems in the direction of more
orderly expression of legal norms.
If the suggestion of a recent Comment in the UCLA Law Review (1976)'
gets implemented by courts in attorney malpractice suits, there will be added
impetus for improving the disorderly syntax that is one of the legal profes-
sion's most visible embarrassments. For those claiming expertise in the art
of communication, the current handling of syntax in legal documents is a
disgrace. The UCLA suggestion would increase the likelihood of legal
liability of draftsmen for harm resulting from such ineptitude by having
courts apply the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur to shift the burden of proof
to the defendant in cases where it is alleged that negligent drafting of an im-
precise document arises from a misuse of language or grammar.
According to this argument, with respect to the application of Res Ipsa
there should not be any difference between the cases where the professional
accused of malpractice is a physician and the professional accused is a law-
yer; in both cases the doctrine should apply whenever the incident giving
rise to the injury "is of such a nature that it can be said, in the light of past
experience, that it probably was the result of negligence by someone and that
the defendant is probably the person who is responsible."
• Professor of Law & Research Scientist, University of Michigan Law School.
Research Attorney, University of Michigan.
'Attorney Malpractice in California: The Liability of a Lawyer Who Drafts An
Imprecise Contract or Will, 24 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 422 (1976).
[VOL. 29
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Whether the incentive for improving legal drafting arises from profession-
al pride ind responsibility or such threats of legal liability, its appearance
should be welcomed. In the legislative area the very credibility of a legal
system is at stake by the manner in which its laws are expressed. This was
forcefully stated in the 1975 Renton Report by the British Committee on the
Preparation of Legislation:
The more legislation there is and the more such legislation tries to deal
with complex situations, the more likely it is that it will itself be com-
plicated and therefore difficult to understand. It may be said that some
degree of complexity and indeed obscurity may be the price we have to
pay if society feels it necessary to satisfy the demands for more and
yet more statute law. For our part we would point out that the price is
a high one and we would urge that it should not be paid too readily. It
is of fundamental importance in a free society that the law should be
readily ascertainable and reasonably clear. To the extent that the law
does not satisfy these conditions, the citizen is deprived of one of his
basic rights and the law itself is brought into contempt.
2
Ambiguity and complexity in written documents can be painlessly tolerated
in many contexts, but in "normative" prose such as that found in statutes,
contracts, and regulations, the social costs are frequently high for inadvertent
drafting lapses that cause uncertainty, unnecessary litigation, and expensive
legal research.
It will be useful to consider the different types of uncertainty of meaning
in what is written in a document.- In the process, this will help clarify the
reference of various terms as used here to discuss some of the problems in
legal drafting. The word "ambiguity" is used here in a restricted sense, while
"uncertainty" is used more broadly to represent anything written in a sentence
which allows that sentence to be interpreted in more than one way. In the
sense intended here "uncertainty" is narrower than "imprecision" but broader
than "ambiguity". Uncertainty is one form of imprecision-namely, that
arising from what is written in the sentence. There is another form of im-
precision, however: that which is caused by what is not written. The rela-
tionships can be summarized as follows:
Imprecision
Uncertainty (written) Incompleteness (unwritten)
Semantic Syntactic
Vagueness Ambiguity
Semantic aspects of a sentence, as used here, refer to how the meaning of
the overall sentence is influenced by the range of meaning given to individual
words and phrases appearing in the sentence. These semantic aspects are in
2 The Renton Report of a Committee on the Preparation of Legislation, O.M.N.D.
6053, ff 2.9 (London 1975).
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contrast to the syntactic aspects of the sentence, which refer to how the
meaning of the overall sentence is influenced by interpretation of the words
that express relationships between the semantic words and phrases, i. e., in-
terpretation of the syntactic words. For example, in the sentence
Persons who are doctors and lawyers qualify.
"Persons", "doctors", "lawyers", and "qualify" are semantic words; and
the word "and" is a syntactic word. Whether a psychologist with a Ph.D.
is a doctor for purposes of this sentence is a semantic question. On the other
hand, whether a person who is a doctor, but is not a lawyer, qualifies by
virtue of the sentence is a syntactic question. The answer depends upon
whether the word "and" is interpreted as relating complete sentences (Al-
ternative 1) or as relating parts of sentences (Alternative 2).
Alternative 1. Persons who are lawyers [qualify] and [persons who are]
doctors qualify.
Alternative 2. Persons who are [both] (doctors and lawyers) qualify.
Vagueness is a semantic uncertainty about precisely where the boundary
is with respect to what a term does and does not refer to. Frequently, but
not always, associated with vagueness is generality. Often confused with
vagueness, generality can be usefully distinguished from vagueness by view-
ing generality as an inclusion relation. For example, the term "penalty" is
more general than the term "fine" and the term "imprisonment". Hence,
so viewed, for a given concept that is not vague (relatively) there are more
general concepts that both include the given concept and are also not vague,
as well as other more general concepts that are vague-perhaps vague to the
extent that it is uncertain whether the given concept is entirely included.
In Figure 1, the class of events that qualify as fires (F) or imprisonments
(I) are included in the class that qualify as penalties (P). Everything in-







Figure 1-Generality without vagueness
In Figure 1, the boundary between penalties and nonpenalties is shown
with no uncertainty as definitely being the line P. It is possible, and fre-
quently occurs, that generality is achieved without being vague. However,
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this example involving penalties might more appropriately be represented as
being more vague as shown in figure 2, i. e., uncertain as to where between
Pa and Pb the boundary is. The shaded area 4 represents the area of un-
certainty.
Figure 2-Generality with vagueness
In Figure 2 it is clear that it is uncertain as to whether or not the imposi-
tion of a sentence to write (W) a 30-page research paper for violation of a
school rule is a penalty. If Pa is the boundary, then the writing assignment
(W) is a penalty; the class of penalties includes everything in both areas
3 and 4, which includes area 5. On the other hand, if Pb is the boundary,
then W is not a penalty; the class of penalties includes only everything in
area 3, but not what is in area 4; so, it does not include area 5.
Ambiguity is uncertainty between relatively few (usually two) distinct al-
ternatives.
Semantic Ambiguity Example: written NON-
It is uncertain whether the word APPROVAL
"approval" refers to written ap- APPROVAL
proval, oral approval, or some
other type of approval, oral other
(1) A unless B.
Syntactic Ambiguity Example: (h) A unt by (
The way in which B is related to Which is meant by (1)?
A by virtue of the word "unless" (1a) If not B, then A.
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Although semantic generality and vagueness are the source of much un-
certainty and litigation, they are frequently useful and desirable tools of the
draftsman to express rules that will cover unforseen circumstances. The un-
certainty from these sources is usually a deliberate matter, rather than as a
result of inadvertence.
The uncertainties arising from syntactic ambiguities tend, however, to be
due more to oversight than intentional choice. Here in dealing with language
normalization, the focus is on this inadvertent type of uncertainty, the am-
biguity that arises from the way in which the meaning of a sentence is influ-
enced by the intended relationships between individual words and phrases
used in the sentence, as distinct from the semantic dimension-the way in
which the meaning of the sentence is influenced by the meaning of the in-
dividual words and phrases.
Language normalization is not a panacea for all drafting and interpreta-
tion problems. Nor is it a means to turn lawyers into logicians. Rather,
normalization is a systematic process for transforming implicit cues in a
statute (or contract or other legal document) into explicit cues, thereby allow-
ing the reader to focus more easily upon fundamental legal issues and policies
underlying the statute rather than to flounder in unnecessary intricacies of
comprehension.
Examples of Need for Normalization
Three examples will be considered of complex and (sometimes) ambiguous
legal syntax that would benefit from being transformed into normalized form.
A system of notation, helpful for communicating in abbreviated form the
normalizing process, will be described along with a summary, of the nor-
malizing process. And, finally, the normalized versions of the three ex-
amples will be presented.
Example 1.
The first example is drawn from a Louisiana case. In State v. Hill, 245
La. 119, 157 So.2d 462 (1963), the Louisiana Supreme Court was faced
with interpreting the following statute:
No person shall engage in or institute a local telephone call, conversation
or conference of an anonymous nature and therein use obscene, profane,
vulgar, lewd, lascivious or indecent language, suggestions or proposals of
an obscene nature and threats of any kind whatsoever.
Hill was charged with unlawfully making an anonymous telephone call t6
a woman during which he used obscene, profane, vulgar, lewd, lascivious and
indecent language and threats. In response to a motion for a bill of particu-
lars, the state conceded that Hill made no specific threats other than those
inherent in words to the effect that he desired sexual intercourse with the
woman he called. Subsequently, the district court dismissed the prosecution,
basing the dismissal on an interpretation of the statute that required both
obscene language and threats as distinct elements of the crime.
[VOL. 29
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The state appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court, contending that the
district court's dismissal was based upon an erroneous interpretation of the
statute. As originally enacted, the statute read:
No person shall engage in or institute a local telephone call, conversation
or conference of an anonymous nature and therein use obscene, profane,
vulgar, lewd, lascivious or indecent language, suggestions or proposals.
and the phrase "of an obscene nature and threats of any kind whatsoever"
was added later. The prosecution argued that the "and" in the added phrase
should be read disjunctively in order to fulfill the intent of the legislature in
enlarging the scope of the statute. The intended effect would have been
achieved by drafting the statute to read "No person shall X or Y". There-
fore, it argued, the court should construe the "and" as an 'or".
This same position can be expressed differently-and more persuasively-
to achieve the same result. Instead of the straining argument to interpret the
"and" as "or" to achieve the legislative intent, the more persuasive argument
is to merely interpret "and" as a full-sentence connecting "and" rather than
a sentence-part connecting "and".
Thus, where the statute formerly said, "No person shall X", it was amend-
ed to say, "No person shall X and Y". The intent of this language, it could
have been argued, was to provide that "No person shall X, and no person
shall Y", rather than as "No person shall (X and Y)". Represented dia-
gramatically (using the actual language of the statute), the state's position,
in effect, was (and could have actually been so argued):
[No person shall[
engage in or institute a local and therein use
suggestions or proposals of any
1. No person shall engage in or institute a local telephone call .
and therein use A, and
2. No person shall engage in or institute a local telephone call . ..
and therein use B.
Hill argued the opposite. le claimed that the legislature used the word
"and" in order to restrict the scope of the statute. Where there was former-
ly a single element to the crime, now it was necessary to show that the de-
1978]
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fendant made threats in a telephone call in addition to using obscene, profane,
etc., language. Since he had failed to make threats in the telephone call upon
which his prosecution was based, the district court had properly dismissed
the charge. Hill's position can also be represented by a diagram:
No person shall
I
engage in or institute a local
telephone call, conversation or
conference of an anonymous nature
A F
obscene, profane, vulgar, lewd,
lascivious or indecent language,








No person shall engage in or institute a local telephone call .
and therein use A and B.
Ultimately, the Louisiana Supreme Court resolved the case by interpreting
the disputed "and" as an "or". It might more discriminatingly have achieved
the same result by interpreting the "and" as a full-sentence connecting "and",
i. e.,
A and BI
rather than a sentence-part connecting "and", i. e.,
A and B
1 L1
It is notable that in reaching the conclusion it did, the court ignored the
common law maxim that criminal statutes are to be construed strictly. It is
fair to ask whether the ambiguity was deliberate. Does deliberately incor-
porating this syntactic ambiguity (if it was done deliberately) in this Lou-
and
[VOL. 29
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isiana criminal statute serve a useful policy goal? Or is it simply another
example of inadvertent ambiguity that is easily overlooked when drafting
statutory language?
Example 2.
Statutory or contractual language, although sometimes relatively free of
syntactic ambiguity, is frequently unnecessarily complicated. If the purpose
of carefully drafted language is to clearly communicate what conditions, when
fulfilled, are sufficient to reach given results, then relating conditions and re-
sults in a simple and recognizable manner can help achieve that purpose. On
the other hand, failure to do so can often render a straightforward idea virtu-
ally unintelligible. The second example is a contractual provision that details
the conditions under which a life insurance policy offered by the Company
will be reinstated:
REINSTATEMENT: If any renewal premium be not paid within
the time granted the Insured for payment, a subsequent acceptance of
premium by the Company or by any agent duly authorized by the Com-
pany to accept such premium, without requiring in connection therewith
an application for reinstatement, shall reinstate the policy; provided,
however, that if the Company or such agent requires an application for
reinstatement and issues a conditional receipt for the premium tendered,
the policy will be reinstated upon approval of such application by the
Company or, lacking such approval, upon the 45th day (30th day in
New Mexico) following the date of such conditional receipt unless the
Company has previously notified the Insured in writing of its disap-
proval of such application. The reinstated policy shall cover only loss
resulting from such accidental injury as may be sustained after the date
of reinstatement and loss due to such sickness as may begin more than
10 days after such date. In all other respects the Insured and the
Company shall have the same rights thereunder as they had under the
policy immediately before the due date of the defaulted premium, sub-
ject to any provisions endorsed hereon or attached hereto in connection
with the reinstatement. Any premium accepted in connection with a re-
instatement shall be applied to a period for which premium has not been
previously paid, but not to any period more than 60 days prior to the
date of reinstatement.
Consider this reinstatement provision with respect to a particular factual situ-
ation. Suppose that-
1. the insured fails to pay a premium within the required time, and
2. he later pays a premium by check which he mails to the Company,
and
3. the Company normally requires an application for reinstatement in
connection with such acceptance, and
4. the Company has not notified the insured in writing that the rein-
statement is disapproved, and
5. two months have elapsed since the policyholder paid the premium.
According to the above provision, should the policy be reinstated? While
it is possible to carefully read the present language and answer the question,
1978]
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the task would be easier if the provision were drafted in normalized form.
Readers may wish to test this for themselves by answering the question on
the basis of the provision as drafted above before reading the normalized
version on page 21.
Example 3.
The third example to illustrate the current state of legal draftsmanship in
the handling of syntax is drawn from what may well be one of the most in-
tensively scrutinized and carefully written legal documents in human his-
tory-namely, the United States Internal Revenue Code. Unfortunately, it
is syntactically typical of the rest of the Code and of other legal drafting-
just plain awful from a syntactic viewpoint. Section 354, which deals with
the legal effects of exchanges of stock and securities in certain corporate re-
organizations, states:
Sec. 354. EXCHANGES OF STOCK AND SECURITIES
IN CERTAIN REORGANIZATIONS
(a) General Rule.-
(1) In General.-No gain or loss shall be recognized if stock or
securities in a corporation a party to a reorganization are, in
pursuance of the plan of reorganization, exchanged solely for
stock or securities in such corporation or in another corpora-
tion a party to the reorganization.
(2) Limitation.-Paragraph (1) shall not apply if-
(A) the principal amount of any such securities received ex-
ceeds the principal amount of any such securities sur-
rendered, or
(B) any such securities are received and no such securities are
surrendered.
(3) Cross Reference.-For treatment of the exchange if any prop-
erty is received which is not permitted to be received under
this subsection (including an excess principal amount of se-
curities received over securities surrendered), see § 356.
(b) Exception.-
(1) In General.-Subsection (a) shall not apply to an exchange in
pursuance of a plan of reorganization within the meaning of
§ 368(a) (1) (D), unless-
(A) the corporation to which the assets are transferred ac-
quires substantially all of the assets of the transferor of
such assets; and,
(B) the stock, securities, and other properties received by such
transferor, as well as the other properties of such trans-
feror, are distributed in pursuance of the plan of reorgan-
ization.
(2) Cross Reference.-For special rules for certain exchanges in
pursuance of plans of reorganization within the meaning of
§ 368(a) (1) (D), see § 355.
[VOL. 29
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(c) Certain Railroad Reorganizations.-Notwithstanding any other pro-
visions of this subchapter, subsection (a) (1) (and so much of § 356
as relates to this section) shall apply with respect to a plan of reor-
ganization (whether or not a reorganization within the meaning of
§ 368(a)) for a railroad approved by the Interstate Commerce
Commission under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, or under § 20b of
the Interstate Commerce Act, as being in the public interest.
Omitting the cross references and using T1, T2, . T9 to abbrevi-
ate the text that expresses the substantive content of the section, the words
used for syntactic purposes to express relationships among the substantive
parts are highlighted and summarized in Figure 3.
(a) General Rule.-
(1) In General.-T1 if T2.








(c) Certain Railroad Reorganizations. Notwithstanding any
other provisions of this 'subchapter, subsection (a) (1) and
so much of section 356 as relates to this section) shall
apply with respect to (whether or not T8) T9.
Figure 3
An analysis of the structure of § 354 indicates a rather simple general rule
set forth in (a)(1) of the form:
If a specified condition is fulfilled,
then a certain legal result occurs.
More briefly:
If S2, then S1.
where S1 and S2 are appropriate sentences constructed from the text parts
T1 and T2. (Here the S1 and S2 are identical to the T1 and T2, but with
some later parts there will be slight modifications required.) The general
rule expressed by (a) (1) can also be represented diagramatically:
>-S2-> Si.
where "if" is represented by ">-" and "then", by "->".
19781
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In (a) (2) there is a limitation expressed which qualifies the (a) (1) gen-
eral rule. In effect, this limitation requires that two more conditions be
fulfilled before result S1 occurs-that is:
If S2 and S3 and S4, then S1.
where S3 and S4 represent sentences that are negations of the sentences
represented by T3 and T4.
Diagramatically:
>-S2-S3-S4- >sI.
There is just one pathway for reaching result S1, and that is the pathway in
which all three of the conditions expressed by S2, S3, and S4 are fulfilled.
Hence, what is flatly stated in (a) (1) is really not so. A reader who has
continued to read as far as (a) (2)-as every knowledgable tax lawyer would
certainly do-sees that only (a) (1) as qualified by (a) (2) seems to be the
case. But not for long will it seem so.
There is an exception encountered in subsection (b). The effect of the
exception is to require that at least one of two more sets of conditions must
be fulfilled before result S1 is reached by virtue of § 354-that is:





In interpreting such diagrams, a result to the right of an arrowhead occurs
whenever there is a pathway extending from the arrowtail to the arrowhead
that has all of its constituent conditions fulfilled.
Thus, in the above diagram there are two pathways, or sufficient sets of
conditions, for reaching result Si :
(1) S2 S3 S4 and S5, and
(2) S2 S3 S4 S6 and S7.
Certainly, whenever a section of a statute includes an exception in one
of its subsections to a general rule set forth in an earlier subsection, a com-
petent attorney should take into account the exception in interpreting the
statute. In this case subsection (b) (1) should be taken into account when
interpreting the general rule set forth in subsection (a). But it is easier to
say that it should be done, than in fact to accomplish it-at least, according
to the evidence.
Sometimes in the Internal Revenue Code not all of the exceptions to a gen-
eral rule will appear in the same section where the general rule appears.
[VOL. 29
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They will, instead, be in other sections. Usually, when this occurs in the In-
ternal Revenue Code, there will be a cross reference, such as (b) (3) in this
case, which indicates that there is another exception to § 354(a) set forth in
§ 355. Such exceptions appearing in other sections should also be taken into
account in interpreting the legal effect of the Internal Revenue Code. But if
there is difficulty in competently taking into account exceptions that appear
in the same section, will there be any less difficulty taking into account those
that appear in other sections? If anything, the physical separation probably
enhances the difficulty. However, it is not the cross-referenced exceptions
that create the greatest problems. Rather, it is the exceptions in other sec-
tions that are not cross referenced that are the most annoying and troublesome.
The existence of such non-cross-referenced exceptions-and they do exist
(See, for example, the absence of a cross reference in § 311 to the exception
to 311(a) that is set forth in § 1245)--explains in part why tax lawyering has
become such a highly-specialized practice. In order to reliably interpret one
section of the Internal Revenue Code, a reader must have a familiarity with
all of the rest of it, because there may be exceptions lurking elsewhere that
are not cross referenced in the section being considered. The part cannot be
known without knowing the whole, and the whole is a lengthy and highly com-
plex document.
To the extent that the tax statutes exemplify the direction that the expres-
sion of statutory law is trending, this is indeed a most unfortunate state of
affairs. In large measure the difficulty can be attributed to a lack of skill in
the management of syntax in the expression of the statutes; and to the extent
that this is the case, it is not only unfortunate, but also unnecessarily so.
Between the extremes of a complete lack of cross referencing and the rifle-
shot referencing to a specific section, there are varying degrees of inexplicit-
ness that add to the difficulty of knowing how the system is going to behave.
An example appears in subsection 354(c) where all of the rest of subchapter
C (93 full pages of dense and highly-complex text) is incorporated by ref-
erence and over-ridden in this context. Subsection (c), in effect, adds an-
other pathway for reaching result S1.
The entire section in simplified (that is, normalized) form provides:
If >=
1. S2, and S2
2. a) 1. S3, and S3
2. S4, and S4
3. a) S5, or S5
b) 1. S6, and 6
2. S7, or '7
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It is instructive to compare the simple syntax of this normalized version
with the complex syntax of current drafting practice as exemplified in Figure
3. In this example of normalized drafting all of the conditions expressed by
S2 through S9 are brought together and related to each other by "and's" and
"or's" to form the antecedent of a simple "if-then" statement. In contrast,
Figure 3 shows the text parts T1 through T9 of the present form of § 354
related by a complex network of interrelationships comprised of a general
rule pared down by a limitation and an exception, which are, in turn limited
by a further exception. The normalized version not only appears intuitively
to be simpler than the present version, but when subjected to the empirical
test of having law students work problems involving both versions, the nor-
malized version results in faster (more than 20 percent on the average) and
more accurate (more than 30 percent on the average) performance.
Sometimes the syntactic complexity of current drafting practices results
in inadvertent ambiguities. There is one here in subsection 354(c). Al-
though it is ambiguous from the actual text whether this subsection is meant
to be an exception only to the exception of subsection (b) or an exception also
to the limitation of subsection (a) (2), the regulations to § 354 clarify that it
is an exception to both. If (c) had been an exception only to (b), the dia-




The full text of the normalized version of § 354 and its accompanying dia-
gram are set forth in Figure 4.
[VOL. 29


















9 . . ....... .......
ED VERSION OF SECTION 354
3TOCK AND SECURITIES IN CERTAIN
REORGANIZATIONS.
ck or securities in a corporation a party to a
rganization are, in pursuance of the plan of
rganization, exchanged solely for stock or se-
ities in such corporation or in another corpo-
on a party to the reorganization, and
1. the principal amount of any such securi-
ties received does not exceed the princi-
pal amount of any such securities sur-
rendered, and
2. it is not so that both (a) some such se-
curities are received and (b) no such se-
curities are surrendered, and
3. (a) the plan of reorganization is not one
within the meaning of section 368(a)
(1) (D), or
... (b) 1. the corporation to which the as-
sets are trafsferred acquires sub-
stantially all of the assets of the
transferor of such assets, and
....... 2. the stock, securities, and other
properties received by such trans-
feror, as well as the other proper-
ties of such transferor, are distrib-
uted in pursuance of the plan of
reorganization, or
1. whether or not the plan of reorganiza-
tion is one within the meaning of section
368(a), and
2. the plan of reorganization is for a rail-
road and is aproved by the Interstate
Commerce Commission under section 77 of
the Bankruptcy Act, or under section 20b
of the Interstate Commerce Act, as being
in the public interest.
then
5......... 3. no gain or loss shall be recognized.
Figure 4
The Normalizing Process
An alternative to the present rather disorganized and chaotic (from a
logical point of view) form of drafting is normalized drafting. Recognizing
that it is exceedingly difficult to talk about syntactic ambiguity and drafting
alternatives without a convenient notation, it is useful to specify one that will
enable statutory provisions to be clearly expressed and easily analyzed.
1978] 393
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In a normalized statute, the logical relationships between simple sentences
are expressed in three different (and redundant) ways: (1) in the text it-
self, (2) in the itemization (i. e., the alpha-numeric reference to the left of
the text that is associated with each sentence), and (3) in an optional diagram













(If a and b, then...)
consequent And
(If .... then a and b.)
Or
(a or b ... )
If and only if ...
(If and only if a, then b.)
... if and only if
(a if and only if b.)
Not
(It is not so that a
Whether or not ...
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Each diagram element (a, b . . . ) corresponds to the sentence im-
mediately to its right and is an abbreviation for that sentence. The diagrams
assist in finding "pathways" or sufficient sets of conditions which, if ful-
filled, lead to particular results. If a pathway can be traced from the "if"
arrow tail (>-) or the "if and only if" arrow tail (>-<) to the "then"
arrow head (->), then a sufficient set of conditions has been fulfilled
to reach the result(s) following the arrow head. Similarly, in a statement of
the form "a if and only if b", tracing all the possible pathways from the
double arrow (<->) to the terminating dot (-0) shows all the possi-
ble sets of sufficient conditions which lead to result "a" being fulfilled.
These elementary forms can be combined to create more complex forms,
and are capable of representing all possible logical relationships between any
set of conditions and results. Several examples are given below:
TEXT DIAGRAM ITEMIZATION
EXAMPLE 1:
If a and b and










If a and (b or
not e), then d.
EXAMPLE 3:




If a and (b or not c).
then
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TEXT DIAGRAM ITEMIZATION
EXAMPLE 5:
If a and (b or not c) If
then a 1. a, and
(d and if e then f, hiN 2. (A) b, or
and if and only if g Nc (B) Nc,
then h). then









If (if a, then b), If






Normalization gives legislators and lawyers a precise tool to state legal
norms by unambiguously relating conditions to desired results. Yet, any de-
sired flexibility can still be achieved by incorporating uncertainty into the
semantic content of sentences through the individual words and phrases
chosen.
However, when a law has already been enacted, any form of the statute
other than the original enactment represents an interpretation. It is important
that any representation which purports to correspond to a statute say neither
more nor less than the statute itself does.
Another advantage of normalized statutes is that such statutes are easier
to comprehend and use than their traditional prose counterparts. Although
comparative research with attorneys is just now underway, preliminary ex-
perimental results indicate that normalized statutes can be understood faster
and more accurately than statutes as they are currently drafted. In a series
of experiments conducted by. the senior author over a period of nine years
at the University of Michigan Law School, groups of second and third-year
students were given problems designed to measure comprehension of various
sections of the Internal Revenue Code. Correct answers depended on the
ability to logically relate relevant portions of the statutes rather than the abil-
ity to analogize or to make semantic judgments. Students using normalized
versions of the statutes answered questions about 20 percent faster and about
30 percent more accurately than they did using the original text of the stat-
utes.
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The procedure for normalizing a statute summarized in Figure 5 provides
an audit trail to allow users of a normalized statute to check for themselves
whether the normalized version corresponds to the original version in the
desired sense of asserting all that and only what the original asserts. Al-
though it may seem that extraordinary and perhaps unnecessary emphasis is
placed on precise notation, terminology, and changes to the present statute
wording, such an emphasis is deliberate. Occasionally, changes may seem
insignificant to the normalizer but have unintended consequences that cannot
be easily detected without a procedure that requires explicit justification for
every change to the original statute. Figure 5 shows the steps involved in
normalizing a statute or other legal document.
Al. Mark the present version of the statute specifying:
a. the sentence-words of the present version, i. e., the words that in
their present form are, or will be transformed into, the constituent
sentences of the normalized version, and
b. the syntax words used in the present version to indicate the logical
relationships between the sentences, and
c. the words to be added or deleted to form the constituent sentences,
and
d. abbreviations for the sentence-words and the constituent sentences.
A2. Construct a syntax outline of the present version from its:
a. sentence-words abbreviations, and
b. syntax words.
A3. Construct one or more detailed marked versions (if necessary.) specify-
ing the justification for, and the manner in whicli, any sentences from
the overall marked version are decomposed into separate constituent
sentences.
A4. Construct intermediate versions of normalized-version diagrams from
the constituent-sentence abbreviations.
A5. Construct the final version of the normalized-version diagram from the:
a. constituent-sentence abbreviations, and
b. intermediate normalized-version diagrams.
A6. Construct the final synthesized syntax outline of the normalized ver-
sion from its:
a. constituent-sentence abbreviations, and
b. normalized syntax words, and
c. the final normalized-version diagram.
A7. Construct the normalized version by replacing the constituent-sentence
abbreviations of the normalized-version syntax outline by constituent
sentences.
1978]
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Nor mlized Examples
The results of this normalizing process are two ways of normalizing the
Louisiana statute that regulates anonymous telephone conversations (1) by
converting its ambiguous within-sentence syntax into unambiguous between-
sentence syntax, and (2) by merely disambiguating the relevant aspects of
its within-sentence syntax. From the viewpoint of facilitating the more ex-
tensive use of computers in helping to process and analyze legal prose, the
first alternative is preferable. It could be written as follows:
if
S1 1. a person engages in or institutes a local tele-
phone call, conversation, or conference of an
anonyrous nature,/and
S2 2. (A) that person therein uses obscene, profane,
vulgar, lewd, lascivious or indecent lan-
guage, suggestions or proposals of an ob-
scene nature, or
S3 (B) that person therein uses threats of any kind
L the whatsoever,vthen
S4 3. that person has engaged in unlawful behavior.
The second alternative could be written:
No person shall engage in or institute a local telephone call, conversation
or conference of an anonymous nature and therein use any of the follow-
ing:
1. obscene, profane, vulgar, lewd, lascivious or indecent language,
suggestions or proposals of an obscene nature, or
2. threats of any kind whatsoever.
Neither of these alternatives deals with the other ambiguities (other than
the one that arose in the Hill case) in this statute. They are probably inad-
vertent ones, also, that should be resolved.
The normalization of the reinstatement provision of the insurance contract
that results from the normalizing process is as follows:
In the factual situation described earlier, conditions Si, and S5 are clearly
fulfilled. However, it is not clear whether condition S3 is fulfilled; although
two months have expired since the policyholder paid the premium, there is no
indication whether and when the conditional receipt was issued and dated. So,
it is unclear whether the policy should be reinstated by virtue of this provi-
sion. More information is needed. It is more likely that a reader will notice
this, if the provision is drafted in the simpler and more logically structured
normalized form than in its present form.
Given the virtues of normalized legal drafting, what is a useful way to be-
come familiar with this style of drafting? One answer to that question can
be found in the query method.
1978]
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If
............. 1. any renewal premium is not paid within the time
granted the Insured for payment, and "
............ 2. (A) there is a subsequent acceptance of premi-
um by the Company or by any agent duly
authorized by the Company to accept such
premium, without requiring in connection











the Company or such agent
* requires an application for reinstate-
ment, and
* issues a conditional receipt for the
premium tendered, and
(A) such application is approved by The
Company, or
(B) the Company has not before the 45th
day (30th day in New Mexico) fol-
lowing the date of such conditional
receipt notified the Insured in writ-
ing of its disapproval of such appli-
cation,
n
the policy shall be reinstated, and
the reinstated policy shall cover only loss re-
sulting from such accidental injury as may be
sustained after the date of reinstatement and
loss due to such sickness as may begin more than
10 days after such date, and
in all other respects the Insured and the Com-
pany shall have the same rights thereunder as
they had under the policy immediately before the
due date of the defaulted premium, subject to
any provisions endorsed hereon or attached here-
to in connection with the reinstatement, and
any premium accepted in connection with a re-
instatement shall be applied to a period for
which premium has not been previously paid,
but not to any period more than 60 days prior to
the date of reinstatement.
QUERY METHOD FOR LEARNING SYNTAX-DRAFTING
The query method can do for statutory analysis in legal education and
practice what case method has done for case analysis. Query method can be
used to direct attention to the policy considerations involved in statutes the
way that case method can be used to direct attention to the policy considera-
tions involved in cases. In the brief account of query method that follows,
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first, some background to this proposed innovation in legal education is
sketched to place it in context and describe some of its properties; then, a
description of query method as a learning activity is presented; this is fol-
lowed by a highly abbreviated example of its -use; and finally, the use of com-
puter-assisted instruction (CAI) and simulations of CAI as modes for using
query method are discussed and exemplified.
Background to Query Method
In the broad context of the total legal system, the effect of the introduction
of query method in legal education will be in the direction of redressing the
balance of power among legislative, executive, and judicial institutions.
Where the power of legislatures have been drastically eroded by incursions of
the other two branches, query method can be a force tending in the direction
of enhancing legislative power.
In the more specific context of legal education, query method will tend to
focus more attention upon the output of legislative institutions than upon the
output of judicial institutions. When Christopher Columbus Langdell intro-
duced case method into American legal education in the late Nineteenth Cen-
tury, he really captured the fort with a method that has dominated the Ameri-
can law school terrain ever since. The relative neglect of statutes and the
drafting of statutes in law school education can in considerable measure be
attributed to the attractiveness of case method as a mode of instruction. With
the advent of a statutory method that can compete in attractiveness (the aim
of query method), perhaps some progress can be achieved in redressing the
imbalance at the law school level in the attention given to legislative institu-
tions relative to judicial institutions.
Wherever language and communication are involved in the legal system and
legal education, the query method will require that attention be given to the
syntactic dimension of communication, as well as to its semantics. At present
legal education is almost solely preoccupied with the semantic dimension-an-
other distortion in need of some rebalancing. Use of query method can help
move the legal profession out of the embarrassing position of matching fine-
ly-honed semantic expertise with syntactic skill that rises hardly above that
of a rank amateur.
Query method as a technique of instruction will provide learners with some-
thing interesting and challenging to do with statutes, something that has been
badly needed for a long time. When done well, the analysis of statutes using
query method calls for the same careful attention to policy issues and policy
thinking that analysis of cases by the case method does-when done well!
Methodologically, the query method technique provides linkage to another
fundamentally important field-namely, to the problem-solving methods of
experimental science. With this technique there are provided opportunities on
a legal problem to engage in and master the basic processes of the classical
hypothetico-deductive approach to scientific method: learning to observe phe-
nomena as carefully and as objectively as possible; learning to theorize-to
explain phenomena as comprehensively as possible; and learning to investi-
gate imaginatively-to ask good questions and to design good experiments.
Query method, when delivered by a computer and viewed as a computer-
assisted instruction (CAI) program, represents a successful "break-through"
in the efforts to reverse the roles of learner and computer in the traditional
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CAI programs. In the traditional programs, the computer poses a problem,
the learner responds, and the computer then branches to the appropriate next
problem to be posed, depending on what response the learner has given.
Sometimes it branches to a remedial loop; sometimes, to a new concept-
whatever is appropriate in light of the understanding (or lack of it) that is
revealed by the learner's responses. Efforts to reverse the roles, having the
learner ask questions in freely discursive prose and having the computer then
respond to the questioning, are limited by the "natural language" barrier.
Computers have some, but very limited, capacity to process the semantic con-
tent of ordinary language in a manner that would be satisfactory for purposes
of legal analysis. In the query method this barrier is circumvented by limit-
ing the types of questions that can be asked and specifying precisely how the
permitted ones are to be put. What, in effect, has been achieved in the query
method is to isolate an educationally significant problem in law for which a
computer can be programmed to respond to the specific types of permitted
questions in such a way as to provide sufficient information to enable a learn-
er to cope with the problem posed. To the extent that the proposed use of
query method in law can be emulated in other fields, it may have significant
implications for educational technology more generally.
Query method is an educational technique that emphasizes learning by doing
on the part of every individual. It is also a highly-individualized learning
technique that can help complement the emphasis upon learning in large
groups that is characteristic of so much of the rest of legal education.
Finally, query method is a technique that probably can be implemented
relatively inexpensively. It just does not require very much by way of re-
sources in manpower and materials.
Description of Query Method as a Learning Activity
Query method is basically a question-asking activity, and the skill being
developed is that of asking good questions. For problem-solving in general,
in law and outside of it, asking good questions is one of man's most funda-
mental and effective problem-solving techniques. Learning to ask good ques-
tions is a skill to be treasured.
The context In which the question-asking occurs in the query method is one
in which the learner is faced with one crucial aspect of the task of drafting a
statute-namely, syntactically relating the relevant ideas. The learner is
given a list of constituent sentences drawn from some actual statute with in-
structions to assemble them to form a statement that corresponds to the actual
statute in the sense that it says all the statute says and no more than the stat-
ute says. In the statement formed, the sentences listed are to be related to
each other by the logic words "and", "or", "not", "if", and "then". The gen-
eral form of the assembled statement will be: If certain conditions are ful-
filled, then specified results occur. In constructing the statement, the learner
can impose conditions to make it difficult to get to certain legal results by the
way that he or she (hereafter abbreviated "s/he") relates various of the
listed sentences; alternatively, s/he can make it easy to get to those results
by relating the required conditions in a different way. In deciding how to
relate the listed sentences to correspond to what the statute says, the learner-
analyst will need to consider the underlying policies involved in what the stat-
ute deals with and to make judgments about which policies are to be empha-
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sized at the expense of which others, to what extent, and how. Thus, the
thrust of query method is to compel learners to examine closely the language,
the syntax, and the policies of a statute in the process of trying to reconstruct
a simplified (i. e., "normalized") version of it.
By examining the list of sentences, the learner-analyst may. be able at the
outset to determine from the semantic content of those sentences alone what
the statute says. Ho~vever, most of the time the statutes that deserve selection
for scrutiny by the query method will be sufficiently complex that s/he will
need some help. That help will be provided by an information source that
gives answers to four kinds of questions that the learner-analyst can ask.
The information source may be a terminal linked to a computer, a touch-tone
telephone serving as a terminal linked to a computer, a programmed pamphlet,
or even another student. From the responses to the questions asked, the
learner can obtain sufficient information to perform the task assigned. The
objective is, with the least number of questions, to complete the task of con-
structing a statement that corresponds to the statute.
Since the statement to be constructed is to be in if-then form relating cer-
tain of the listed sentences that express conditions to certain others of the
listed sentences that express results, the first subtask of the learner-analyst
will be to classify the listed sentences into those that express conditions and
those that express results. There are two kinds of questions that can be asked
to help on this subtask. The first is called a Specific question; it asks: Does
this listed sentence express a result? The second is called a Global question;
it asks: Does this set of listed sentences express all of the results and only
results? After s/he has the listed sentences classified into conditions and
results, the learner-analyst may want to ask the third kind of question-the
Relational question. It asks: Does this result occur, when this set of condi-
tions is fulfilled? Finally, the learner-analyst can check whether the state-
ment that s/he has formed on the basis of the data provided corresponds to
the statute by asking the fourth kind of question-the Ultimate question. It
asks: Is this (setting forth the logical structure that relates all of the listed
sentences) a statement that corresponds to the statute? The responses to the
first three kinds of questions will be either "Yes" or "No". However, if the
learner-analyst's hypothesis is incorrect, the response to an Ultimate question
will also provide some diagnostic information about how it is incorrect; it
will indicate whether the hypothesis says more than the statute, less than the
statute, or both more than and less than the statute.
The syntax-drafting problems posed in the query method tasks can vary
widely in difficulty. The degree of difficulty will depend upon not only the
number and complexity of the listed sentences but also upon which of five
different levels of difficulty the problem has been formulated at. These five
levels of difficulty are characterized in terms of the number of constituent
sentences in the ultimate statement constructed and the content of those con-
stituent sentences compared to the content of the sentences listed; the five
levels are summarised in Table 1.
As the learner becomes more skillful in asking questions and in the syntax-
drafting of statutes, s/he can move to more-difficult level problems to keep
the task interesting and challenging. At each level the learner can ask as
many or as few questions as s/he needs to ask. S/he may need much help-
or very little; s/he gets whatever is needed. As skill in statutory analysis
29 Journal of Legal Ed. No. 4-2
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Table 1
Levels of Difficulty of Query Method Problems in Terms of
Number of Constituent Sentences and the Content of
Constituent Sentences Compared to Listed Sentences
Level Number Content Key
1 = A = The number of constituent sen-
tences is equal to the number of
listed sentences.
2 N > The number of constituent sen-
tences is greater than the number
3 > N of listed sentences.
4 > D A Each of the constituent sentences is
a listed sentence.
5 > N or D N Some of the constituent sentences
(or both) are not listed; they are negates of
listed sentences.
D Some of the constituent sentences
are not listed; they are descriptive
parts of listed sentences that ex-
press results.
increases, less and less will be required. At the outset, the task to many
lawyers and law students will seem formidable and challenging, but with the
development of skills in syntactic processing to complement the already high-
ly-refined semantic skills of lawyers, the learners exposed to query method
will probably soon achieve an overall and comprehensive perspective and then
easily handle such problems.
Example of Query Method for a Criminal Contempt Statute
The learner is provided with the following list of sentences and told that the
problem is of difficulty level 4:
a. a witness intentionally refuses to comply with a subpoena issued
pursuant to § 5003
b. a witness refuses to answer any question without justification under
§ 5008, including, but not limited to, refusal to answer on grounds
of self-incrimination where protected by an order of immunity un-
der § 4014
c. a witness intentionally responds to a question in an evasive manner
d. the witness may be held in criminal contempt
e. the witness may be fined not exceeding $10,000 or imprisoned not
exceeding one year, or both
f. the witness subsequently testifies pursuant to the same or similar
investigatory deposition order
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g. that testimony may be considered by the court as a basis for reducing
the sentence imposed

























Specific question: Does sentence d
express a result?
Global question: Does the set of sen-
tences, d e and g, express all of the re-
sults and only results?
Relational question: Does result d
occur when condition a is fulfilled?
R: Does d occur when b is fulfilled?
Ultimate question: Does this state-
ment correspond to the statute?
R: Does e occur when a is fulfilled?
R: Does e occur when a and b are ful-
filled?
R: Does e occur when a, b, and c are
fulfilled?
R: Does e occur when a and the de-
scriptive part of d are fulfilled?
U: Does this statement correspond to
the statute?
U: Does this correspond to statute?
aDdf>g? No R: Does g occur when a, Dd, and f
are fulfilled?
aDdDef>g? Yes R: Does g occur when a, Dd, De, and
f are fulfilled?
a U: Does this correspond to the stat-> -- d ute ?
_-5- > E-;-Dd-> E e
>LDe.f->g
Congratulations!
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This learner used one Specific question, one Global question, eight Relational
questions, and four Ultimate questions in successfully constructing a normal-
ized statement that corresponds to the statute. That normalized statement of
the statute is shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6
If
(1) a witness intentionally refuses to comply with a subpoena issued pursuant
to § 5003, or
(2) a witness refuses to answer any question without justification under
§ 5008, including, but not limited to, refusal to answer on grounds of
self-incrimination where protected by an order of immunity under § 4014,
or
(3) a witness intentionally responds to a question in an evasive manner,
then
(4) a. the witness may be held in criminal contempt, and
b. if
1. the witness is held in criminal contempt,
then
2. the witness may be fined not exceeding $10,000 or imprisoned
not exceeding one year, or both, and
3. if
a. the witness is fined not exceeding $10,000 or imprisoned not
exceeding one year, or both, and
b. the witness subsequently testifies pursuant to the same or
similar investigatory deposition order,
then
c. that testimony may be considered by the court as a basis for
reducing the sentence imposed.
Query Method by Computer-Assisted Instruction and Simulations
Analysis of statutory syntax by the query method can be done in a variety
of modes. Probably the most handy and inexpensive will be some variation of
computer-assisted instruction or a simulation of it. Query method can also
be used in an individualized manner with another student serving as an in-
formation source. Some will undoubtedly want to use it in the usual many-
to-one classroom situation with the instructor providing the responses to
probes by students; it can be used that way, too.
The computer software for putting query method problems into various
sizes of computers has already been developed, and sample statutory provi-
sions are available for demonstration. A master program in the Basic pro-
gramming language has been developed to run on the Michigan Terminal Sys-
tem (MTS), the university's interactive time-sharing Amdahl 470V/6 instal-
lation, which is equivalent to the IBM 370-168. With this master program,
a statutory provision that has been transformed into normalized form can be
stored as a query method problem in the computer in just a few minutes. That
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query method problem, can then be delivered by telephone to a terminal for
instructional use any place in the world that is linked to telephone service in
the United States. A second alternative currently being developed is an
auxiliary program that will permit any touch-tone telephone to serve as a
terminal for using the query method problems stored on MTS.
For the third alternative, the I-IP-65 programmable hand calculator (micro-
computer), individual programs must be written for each statutory provision.
A total of six sample programs have been developed for illustrative purposes
to show how query method problems can be handled on this device. These
programs can be duplicated in a few seconds on magnetic strips that cost only
40 cents each. The prototype for programs for the HP-65 has been developed,
and it should be possible to develop programs for additional statutory provi-
sions in two or three hours for each one. The ease of duplication will make
it easy for cooperative instructors at different institutions to share programs
that are developed. There is, of course, a limit to the size provision that can
be dealt with in a manageable fashion on the HP-65, which is limited to 100-
step programs. However, one provision that has been programmed for this
device has 15 listed sentences. That number is probably about the outside
limit that is manageable. However, that number is sufficient for most stat-
utes that instructors will want to deal with by the query method.
The fourth alternative is an adaptation of the Instructional Math Play
(IMP) Kits associated with the instructional game called EQUATIONS:
The Game of Creative Mathematics. These adaptations are simulations of a
computer as a data source, and they are in the form of printed pamphlets.
These Statutory Analysis Pamphlets (SAPs), however, are even more lim-
ited than the programs on the HP-65 in terms of the size of statutory provi-
sion that is manageable in this form. For provisions that go up to difficulty
level 3, the outside limit on the number of listed sentences is probably seven
or eight. A provision with seven conditions would require a pamphlet of
about 12 pages, and for each additional condition the number of pages re-
quired would increase by a factor of three.
One example of a SAP has been constructed; it is for § 2056(b) (1) (A)-
(C) of the Internal Revenue Code and consists of a set of five sentences that
has the following syntactic structure:
>-ba-
This example is included as Appendix B.
For the final two alternative modes of doing statutory analysis by the
query method-the modes in which another person serves as the information
source-all that the other person needs in order to be able to respond accu-
rately is the diagram of the syntactic structure of the provision. Thus, for
the criminal contempt provision exemplified on page 15, all the other student
would need in order to respond to the question of the individual learner, and
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all the instructor would need to respond to the questions of the class, would
be the diagram:
b+] V> d_.~cE Dd->Le>_De-f_>g.
Finally, the technology for supporting small time-share systems on mini-
computers is rapidly evolving. When ones are available of appropriate size
and cost for computer-assisted instruction use in law schools, a program
should be developed for delivering query method problems on such systems.
APPENDIX A
The importance of the skillful use of language in law generally (and in the
drafting of statutes particularly) is clearly reflected in the writings of legal
scholars and other commentators. A sampling gives the flavor and lends
support to the pair of propositions: (1) legal drafting is important, and (2)
it is now badly done and needs to be improved.
The law is a profession of words . . .. The profession is prop-
erly more concerned with rights, obligations, and wrongs, and the inci-
dental procedures . . .. But the main objectives suffer when the
principal tool of the whole process is neglected. (Mellinkoff 1963, p.
vii).
Language is perhaps the greatest of all human inventions. Most peo-
ple think of it merely as the chief means of communication, but it is
much more than that; it is the chief medium of thought . . .. For
lawyers, language has a special interest because it is the greatest instru-
ment of social control . . . [W]ords are of central importance for
the lawyer because they are, in a very particular way, the tools of his
trade. (Williams 1945, p. 71).
There is no doubt that the practice of law does as much as anything
can to give a man an understanding of how words work and of what can
be done with them. (Philbrick 1949, p. v).
The most determined will in the lawgiver, the most benevolent and
sagacious policy, and the most happy choice of and adaptation of means,
may all, in the process of drawing up the law, be easily sacrificed to the
incompetency of a draftsman. (Goode 1842).
For the lawyer more than for most men, it is true that he who knows
but cannot express what he knows might as well be ignorant . .
[I]n much of what a lawyer does, it is not enough that he knows the
right answer; he must convince another lawyer, a judge or a jury, or ex-
plain to (and perhaps convince) a client. The knowledge or wisdom he
has in his head is of no use to anyone unless he can communicate it to
others. (Weihofen 1961, p. 1).
Words are the principal tools of lawyers and judges, whether they
like it or not. They are to us what the scalpel and insulin are to the
doctor, or a theodolite to the civil engineer. (Chafee 1941, p. 382).
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It is not the function of a draftsman either to originate or determine
legislative policy. But the dividing line between policy and law, between
form and substance, is not a sharp one, and the draftsman cannot es-
cape being involved in policy discussions. Although the draftsman is not
responsible for policy, he must nevertheless consider whether the pre-
scribed policy is capable of implementation . . . The draftsman
also makes a contribution in rounding out the policy and filling in the
details. Legislative proposals usually come in the form of broad state-
ments, leaving a multitude of minor details still to be worked out. Many
of these details occur to the draftsman when he first examines his in-
structions, but there are always additional policy matters that cannot be
known or foreseen until the drafting process is well under way. (Dried-
ger 1956, p. xi).
Intellectually, the draftsman's skills are the highest in the practice of
law. Judges at bottom need merely reach decisions, . . . negoti-
ators and advocates need understand only as much of a situation as will
gain a victory for their clients; counselors can be bags of wind
But the documents survive, and to draw them up well requires an extra-
ordinary understanding of everything they are supposed to accomplish
• . Probably the greatest compliment a lawyer can receive from his
profession (a compliment never publicized) is an assignment to draft a
major law. (Mayer 1966, pp. 50-51).
It would be hard to exaggerate the importance of knowing how to
prepare an adequate legal instrument. This is particularly true of stat-
utes. Sound government depends upon legislation that says the right
thing in the right way, in language that is as clear, simple, and accessible
as possible. (Dickerson 1954, p. 3).
[T]here are definite and positive goals to be attained by
simpler statute-writing. There are definite techniques which will help
in attaining these goals. When the goals and techniques are known to the
profession, better laws will be written . . . Nearly everyone com-
plains about the obscurity of statutes. Grumblings have been heard
spasmodically ever since Jeremy Bentham gave his "six remedies for
long-windedness" . . . (Conard 1947, p. 458).
It has been said that the things most commonly used by lawyers are air
and language. One writer suggested that, sadly, nobody pays attention
to either air or language unless it happens to stink . . . This should
not be true of lawyers . . . (Cooper 1953, p. 2).
Although there is no disagreement about the fundamental importance of
language in law, there is little satisfaction expressed (and much dissatisfaction
does appear in print) about the written performances of lawyers. In the eyes
of some critics the profession's use of language is so inept as to give rise to
suspicions about motives and competency.
Almost all legal sentences, whether they appear in judges' opinions,
written statutes, or ordinary bills of sale, have a way of reading as though
they had been translated from the German by someone with a rather
meager knowledge of English. Invariably they are long. Invariably
they are awkward . . . [T]he language of The Law seems almost
19781
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designed to confuse and muddle the ideas it purports to convey. That
quality of legal language can itself be useful only if the ideas themselves
are so confused and muddled and empty that an attempt to express those
ideas in clear, precise language would betray their true nature. In that
case muddiness of expression can serve very nicely to conceal muddiness
of thought. And no segment of the English language in use today is so
muddy, so confusing, so hard to pin down to its supposed meaning as the
language of The Law. It ranges only from the ambiguous to the com-
pletely incomprehensible. (Rodell 1939, pp. 185-186).
There is widespread consensus that legal writing can stand some improve-
ment and that something needs to be done about it.
[T]he laws which have found their various ways into the
statute books of English-speaking countries . . . are spoken of as
disgraceful, unworkmanlike, defective, unintelligible, abounding in
errors, ill-penned, inadequate, loosely-worded, depraved in style, peculiar
absurdities, mischievous, baneful in influence-and besides, in their
making "technical skill is often below the mark." . . . [T]hey are
uncertain, confusing, obscure, ill-expressed, ambiguous, overbulky, re-
dundant, entangled, unsteady, disorderly, complex, to say nothing of
being "uncognoscible." (Guide to Legislative Drafting in Arizona 1941,
p. 9).
Legal drafting is like the weather: often talked about, but seldom re-
formed. Many lawyers seem only dimly aware that the profession is
falling far short of its potential. (Stason 1965).
Actually, the legal profession is falling far below its real potentialities,
not only in the highly specialized field of legislative drafting, but in the
general field (which touches every lawyer) of preparing contracts, wills,
leases, and conveyances. (Dickerson 1954, p. 4).
This study began with the hypothesis that many laws are inadequate
for the purposes for which they were designed, and that most deficiencies
result from the use of outmoded methods of drafting, screening and
processing legislation. Poor draftsmanship can cause confusion in many
areas: it may cloud the purpose and intent of the proposed legislation
before enactment; it may encourage misinterpretation and misapplica-
tion by the bar; and, it may affect both judicial and executive imple-
mentation, of the law at national, state and local levels. (American Bar
Foundation Project 1972, p. 708).
Unfortunately, many lawyers have tended not only to downgrade im-
portant aspects of drafting but to think of themselves as individually
accomplished in this respect. (Dickerson 1965, p. 3).
The law needs a literature on how to write laws that is not contained
in present treatises on statutory interpretation. (Conard 1947, p. 481).
With such strong expressions of the shortcomings of the legal profession
in such a fundamental aspect of its work as its use of language, we really
ought to try to do something about it.
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1978] NORMALIZED LEGAL DRAFTING
APPENDIX B
a. on the lapse of time, on the occurrence of an event or contingency or on
the failure of an event or contingency to occur, an interest passing to the
surviving spouse will terminate or fail
b. an interest in such property passes or has passed (for less than an ade-
quate and full consideration in money or money's worth) from the de-
cedent to any person other than such surviving spouse (or the estate of
such spouse)
c. by reason of such passing such person (or his heirs or assigns) may pos-
sess or enjoy any part of such property after such termination or failure
of the interest so passing to the surviving spouse
d. such interest is to be acquired for the surviving spouse, pursuant to the
directions of the decedent, by his executor or by the trustee of a trust
e. no deduction shall be allowed under this section with respect to such inter-
est





































































Sentences a b c d e
Coded Responses IBe BI Bs Bz D
Decoding Table p = NO q = YES
a b c d e f g h i j k lm n o p q r s t u vw x y z
A q p p p q p p
B p pp p p pp p pp p p p
C p q q p p p p p
D p pq p p p p p p
E p q p p p p p
Fpp p P I P PP P P P P
G q p p p q p p P
H p p p p p p p
I p p q p p p p
" p P ) P P P P
K p q p P p q P
L p p P P P P P P
I p p p p p p p p
N p p p p p p p
0 pI p p p p p p
Pp P P P P P P P
Q P P P p P p p p
R q p p p p p p
S p p p p p p p
T p p p P q P P P
U p p p P P P P P
v q p p p p p p
W pp p p p p p
X p p p p p p p
Y p P P P P P P
Z p p p p q p q p
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Q3.1 Number of Lean Pathways Questions
# of Lean Pathways 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
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